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1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORKx
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
4	v. 21 CR 636(JPC)
5	RICARDO CRUCIANI, Conference
6	Defendant.
7	x
8	New York, N.Y. February 15, 2022
9	10:00 a.m. Before:
10	HON. JOHN P. CRONAN,
11	District Judge
12	APPEARANCES
13	
14	DAMIAN WILLIAMS, United States Attorney for the
15	Southern District of New York BY: JANE KIM
16	Assistant United States Attorney
17	DAVID PATTON FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF NEW YORK, INC.
18	Attorney for Defendant BY: DANIEL HABIB
19	MARK B. GOMBINER
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(Case called)

DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel starting with the government, please state your name for the record.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MS.}}$ KIM: Good afternoon. Jane Kim for the government.

THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Kim.

MR. GOMBINER: Mark Gombiner and Daniel Habib for Mr. Cruciani. And, Judge, Mr. Habib is in our appeals unit, and he was the one who basically did the response here, and, in that respect, I have to apologize to the Court when I ask Mr. Habib to do this. I neglected because I completely forgot that the Court had requested us to address certain specific cases, but Mr. Habib is definitely prepared to do that now.

THE COURT: Excellent. Thank you, Mr. Gombiner. And, Mr. Habib, it's good to see you.

MR. HABIB: Likewise, your Honor. My pleasure.

THE COURT: And good morning to Mr. Cruciani as well.

First of all, thank you for appearing on relatively short notice for this proceeding. As Mr. Gombiner just previewed, the purpose of today's proceeding is to address Mr. Cruciani's application that certain documentation submitted in support of his request for appointment of counsel under the Criminal Justice Act be filed ex parte and under seal. And the documents that we're talking about are the initial CJA form. I believe it's Form 23, which is the one-page financial affidavit

used in most cases. And, here, it's dated November 29th, 2021. And also a supplemental affidavit for Mr. Cruciani with an appendix that I received initially under seal on January 26th, 2022. And that supplemental affidavit was submitted in light of questions I had as to the defendant's financial eligibility for a court-appointed counsel. It was for a few reasons, including his former employment, various property that was posted in connection with his release on bail, and that he initially appeared with retained counsel.

So I've reviewed the supplemental submissions letter from the Federal Defenders dated February 2nd, the government's letter dated February 9th. And I thought it would be most efficient to have this conference to discuss the application and possibly resolve it as well.

Mr. Gombiner, let me start with what you just touched upon. The government's submission addressed a few authorities; the Second Circuit decision in *Harris* and *Suarez*,

Judge Furman's decision in *Avenatti*, I believe Judge Sweet's decision in *Hilsen*, and the district CJA plan. Why don't I give you and Mr. Habib a chance to orally respond to those authorities, then?

MR. GOMBINER: Mr. Habib.

THE COURT: Thank you. And, Mr. Gombiner, expect us to be done by 10:45. I know you have something after this.

MR. GOMBINER: Yes.

THE COURT: But if we get close and you need to leave and let ${\tt Mr.}$ Habib handle anything that remains --

MR. GOMBINER: That would be great. That would be the most efficient way to do it. Thank you, Judge. I know
Mr. Habib can handle it. Thank you.

MR. HABIB: Thank you, your Honor. I appreciate it.

Let me address the questions that the Court posed at the last appearance. I think the first one, which can be addressed most easily, is Section VI(E) of the district CJA plan, Section V of this district's CJA plan, which I have brought copies, if the Court or the government wants, and they indicate that the judicial conference guidelines are incorporated by reference into this district's CJA plan.

THE COURT: Mr. Habib, you're welcome to stay seated if you prefer. It might be easier with our masks. It's a lot easier if the microphone is closer.

MR. HABIB: Okay. Thank you, your Honor.

Section V of this district's CJA plan says, quote, representation pursuant to this plan shall be furnished to any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation...in the circumstances set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3006A, and in the guidelines promulgated by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts...which are incorporated by reference.

As was noted in our supplemental filing and that of

prior counsel, those guidelines expressly provide that documents submitted in connection with an application for CJA counsel will be maintained under seal and disclosed neither to the government nor to the public. And so in light of that expressed incorporation of those guidelines, I think it would be incorrect to interpret VI(E) to abrogate by implication those incorporated guidelines.

What I think Section VI(E) is getting at is in the circumstances where the government does come to learn of the contents of materials submitted in connection with an application, as for example, when a defendant chooses to testify to his eligibility in open court, as the plan contemplates, the government, as in *Branhart*, would be precluded from using that material in its case and chief. I don't think it can be read as broad disclosure authority.

The Court also asked Mr. Cruciani to address the circuit's decision in *Harris* and *Suarez*. What I'll say is neither decision is dispositive, as I think even Judge Furman recognized in *Avenatti*, neither concerned an application such as the application at issue here.

Suarez holds that there's a First Amendment interest in CJA vouchers, but Suarez locates that interest in, quote, the public's strong interest in how its funds are spent in the administration of criminal justice and what amounts of public funds are paid to particular private attorneys.

The financial affidavit at issue here indicates different interests. It doesn't reflect how much attorneys are being paid, it doesn't reflect how much experts are being paid. It indicates how much a single defendant that this Court has determined to be entitled to CJA representation has and what assets certain family members of his have.

That said, the First Amendment interests discussed in Suarez can be fully accommodated through existing provisions of the CJA. So, for example, Section 3006A(d)(4)(A) provides that amounts paid to counsel shall be made available to the public, and Subsection (e)(4) provides that amounts paid to experts and other support services shall be made available to the public. So those interests can be addressed without disclosure of the financial affidavit.

It's also true in *Suarez* that the only countervailing interest the defendant asserted was a prejudice to his trial rights; that is, the defendant was concerned that disclosure of the amounts that the public had financed for his defense might prejudice his jury in his upcoming trial.

And so Suarez had no occasion to consider the countervailing interest we've asserted here, which is the financial privacy and personal privacy of Mr. Cruciani, and in addition, innocent third-party family members discussed in the financial affidavit.

I would also note that Suarez relies on the judicial

conference guidelines to conclude that if disclosure would, quote, unduly intrude on defendant's privacy, the disclosure might not be warranted or that sealing would be appropriate.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Forgive me. Why can't that be achieved by redaction?

MR. HABIB: So, obviously, our fallback position would be that redaction would be appropriate as to much of the information in the affidavit, but I think before we get to that point, before we begin redacting sort of line by line, I would urge the Court to consider — and I can make this point in greater length in the course of presenting an affirmative argument. But to consider, A, whether these materials are judicial documents in the first instance and, B, whether countervailing interests weigh against disclosure.

So in a sense, we may be arguing about degrees of redaction, but we would urge that full redaction in this situation is appropriate.

Harris, as I read Harris, and I understand that

Judge Furman read it more broadly than I'm about to propose,

but I read Harris as a case about adversary proceedings, not

about public disclosure.

Harris affirmed the termination of CJA counsel where the defendant declined to demonstrate his eligibility in an adversarial proceeding. He wanted an ex parte proceeding. And Judge Furman reads Harris to say -- and, granted there's

language in *Harris* that talks about our judicial system's aversion to secret proceedings. But what I read *Harris* to say is this is an adversarial process, and the government has a role to play, and the government has a role to play in, as appropriate, contesting financial eligibility. *Harris* does not, by its own terms, discuss the First Amendment or the common law presumption of access. Those considerations simply aren't presented in the case.

In addition, the countervailing interest in *Harris*, again, is not financial privacy of the defendant and third parties; as here, it's the Fifth Amendment. *Harris* holds that that interest can be reconciled through use immunity. It's not the argument that Mr. Cruciani has pressed here.

THE COURT: And you're arguing that it should be ex parte; not just sealed. You're seeking sealed, ex parte treatment of the affidavit?

MR. HABIB: And I recognize that is the tougher part of our position, in light of Harris. Except that I would say Harris holds that ex parte presentation is inappropriate to ensure adversarial testing. This Court has already determined that Mr. Cruciani is eligible for counsel, so I'm not sure what further role, barring the government's discovery of additional financial information and adversarial process, would play in this specific case.

As to Judge Furman's opinion in Avenatti, obviously,

it holds against us. That said, it's entitled to persuasive force only. But let me address the role of the judicial conference guidelines in the context of that case.

This Court pointed out, as Judge Furman did, that the guidelines can't supersede the First Amendment, and we agree with that, obviously. But the guidelines aren't just policy statements. They're promulgated pursuant to a statutory delegation of authority, and that's at Section 3006A(h), as in Harry, which directs the judicial conference to promulgate regulations concerning the administration of the CJA. And, in that sense, they absolutely can displace, for example, the common law presumption of access. That's the purpose of codified law, is to displace common law where deemed appropriate.

THE COURT: Putting aside the First Amendment right to access, if that didn't exist, would it be your view that a rule promulgated or a rule promulgated pursuant to section 3006A(h), that was inconsistent with the common law right of access would prevail over the common law right of access?

MR. HABIB: Yes, your Honor. In the same way the federal rules of evidence have the ability to displace common law privileges, for example.

In addition, as to the Constitutional question, I don't think this Court should assume that either the judicial conference or the framers of the rule 49.1, the rules of

Criminal procedure and the drafters of the Advisory Committee Notes, would likely disregard the First Amendment interests at issue here. Indeed, the Supreme Court has said with respect to the judicial conference that its rules are entitled to respect, and Judge Weinstein made the same point in the case cited in our papers.

In addition, the Supreme Court said in Vaughan, when construing the meaning of the rules of criminal procedure, the Advisory Committee Notes is entitled to weight. It's of weight. And the Advisory Committee Notes clearly contemplates that if the rule doesn't, by its own terms, provide for sealing that rule 49.1(d) and (e) should be used to effectuate the objective of shielding this information from public disclosure.

So I would say I take the Court's point that the guidelines can't trump the Constitution, but I think they absolutely can trump the common law, and I think they are entitled even in the Constitutional analysis to very respectful consideration because they reflect the considered judgment of judges and players in the criminal justice system.

The Court also asked us to address Judge Sweet's decision in *Hilsen*. I view *Hilsen* as a pretty straightforward application of *Harris*. I don't see that as advancing the analysis, although it certainly was, as was Judge Sweet's wont, comprehensive.

Let me address the merits of Judge Furman's views in

Avenatti. And I would say this: It's really a three-step process. Is this a judicial document? If so, what weight is afforded the presumption, and what are the countervailing interests asserted?

We respectfully disagree with Judge Furman's conclusion that this document is a judicial document. We urge the Court to follow the First Circuit in that respect.

Judge Furman indicated it's an open question in this circuit whether this specific document is judicial.

And I would just say without belaboring the point, a CJA affidavit is I think far removed from what the circuit has said is the core of judicial documents, which is case adjudication. As the Court knows, Article III judges rarely have occasion to review CJA financial affidavits, and the vast majority of case, that's done by the magistrate on the day of presentment.

Even in *Brown v. Maxwell*, the Second Circuit said that even materials related to -- for example, for the management of discovery or the presentation of evidence at trial via motions in *limine* would be subject to a weaker presumption. This document is farther removed still.

THE COURT: So I guess what I'm struggling with,
Mr. Habib, certainly, I understand your point that usually
often the defendant makes, but the case law seems to have
struck that whether something is a judicial document turns on

whether the document is relevant to the performance of a judicial function, which is defined to include the exercise of supervisory powers.

The financial affidavits here were used by me to decide whether your client is eligible for publicly funded counsel. Even if that's not how the judicial function may often be thought about in a day-to-day proceeding in this courthouse, why isn't that relevant to my exercises for supervisory powers?

MR. HABIB: I think the best thing I could say about that, your Honor, is that as the First Circuit did, the determination of CJA eligibility is more properly characterized as an administrative rather than a judicial responsibility.

But as I said, I don't want to belabor that point.

Let me talk about interest balancing here because I think we have certainly a stronger case there.

So, again, in Avenatti, as in Harris, the only countervailing interest asserted was the Fifth Amendment, which we haven't pressed here. Avenatti follows Harris by using use immunity to reconcile those interests. We are asserting different countervailing interests here. And so at the second step, you not only weigh the strength of the presumption, which if the Court concludes these are judicial documents, I think, at best, the presumption would be at its weakest with respect to these documents. And against that, we've asserted -- I want

to assert a couple of interests; one, obviously, is the financial privacy of Mr. Cruciani and the innocent third parties who are discussed in the financial affidavit. As we demonstrated in our prior supplemental filing, financial privacy is routinely cited as a basis to justify sealing, including by the Second Circuit in one of its Amadeo decisions.

In addition, I think there are profound

Sixth Amendment interests at play here. We touched on them in our brief, but they are these. The Sixth Amendment entitles any indigent defendant to the appointment of counsel upon demonstration of eligibility.

If CJA affidavits are routinely disclosed to the public, that's going to exert a significant chill on the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right. In particular, it's going to exert a chill because this matter is typically adjudicated on the day of presentment, which as the Court knows it is a busy day, it's a hectic day, defense counsel has met its client for the first time, defense counsel has numerous tasks on that day, including explaining the complaint, attending the pretrial services interview, communicating with family members to secure a bond, communicating with family members to potentially identify property that can be used to secure a bond, discussing with the prosecutor the conditions of pretrial release order, appearing in the magistrate court for the presentment, times the three or four or five cases that a

defense lawyer might get on a duty date.

To layer into that process, the additional complication of not only must you complete the financial affidavit, but I must tell you that your answers are going to be made public, not only to the prosecutor, but to the world, would have, I think, Number One, a significant chilling effect on the defendant's exercise of his rights, and Number Two, serious consequences for the efficient administration of justification in magistrate court.

If I can make the point more concretely, many of the Federal Defenders' clients appear for presentment, and they complete a financial affidavit that says that they essentially have de minimis assets and significant debt. They may not be working, they may have credit card debt, car debt, et cetera. That's a lot of information for a person who's been arrested for the first time maybe in his life, to disclose to the world on what's probably the worst day of his life.

It would be extraordinarily difficult and add to the already difficult task of appointed counsel on the day of presentment to explain that process in addition to all the other tasks counsel has on that day. And I don't think it's a reach, and I don't think it's speculation to say that some indigent defendants who are entitled — unquestionably, factually entitled — to appointment of counsel will be dissuaded from requesting it through shame or embarrassment or

fear, or for example, the interests of third parties that they would be required to disclose. For example, the financial affidavit asks do you have dependents, and a dependent might be a spouse or it might be a sibling or a parent. All those things might be the source of reticence to assert their Sixth Amendment right.

So I think in that respect, and returning, if I may, to both the guidelines and the Advisory Committee Notes, when this Court is weighing countervailing interests, I think it should not only give respectful consideration to those authorities on the question whether these are judicial documents, but whether the interests of the defendant in asserting his Sixth Amendment right, when he has it — that is, when he's entitled to appointed counsel — and of the magistrate court in processing the many cases they come across on a duty day, recommend or rule according to which the defendant can simply complete the affidavit quickly and candidly, confidentially that the affidavit is being used for nothing other than the determination of the appointment of counsel, period.

I should also note that there will be cases in which it would be ineffective assistance for defense counsel not to talk about the strategic consequences of making a full disclosure on a financial affidavit. And defense counsel is particular in cases of financial crimes, and I take the point

there's use immunity, but that's not the only -- you know, use in case in chief is not -- barring use in case in chief is not the same as barring use --

THE COURT: And I take your point that there may be cases where that would be a stronger argument. There's not a Fifth Amendment argument here, though.

MR. HABIB: We haven't pressed them on this case, no.

THE COURT: And your chilling argument, your argument that if you chill the right to counsel, was that made before Judge Furman or Judge Oetken in a similar way in *Correia*? Do you know if that was made before either of those courts?

MR. HABIB: I don't know what arguments were made in Judge Oetken's case, truthfully. I reviewed the papers in Judge Furman's case. I don't think that argument was pressed.

Can I check and tell the Court? The Court can also use PACER too. I don't know the answer, Judge.

THE COURT: Do you think it matters, given the posture here, and that it is not a typical situation like you were just describing, but rather we have a defendant who appeared with three retained counsel, posted very sizable bail by posting, I believe, three properties, and based on the allegations, appeared for much of his life to have a high-paying job? Does that factor in?

MR. HABIB: Those factors certainly warranted this Court in making inquiry, which this Court did. But I think

we're now addressing a distinct question, which is disclosure.

And, again, not only did this Court make inquiry, but this

Court made a determination. So I think the interests reflected

by the factors the Court just mentioned have been addressed.

I think that's what I had to say, but I'm happy to answer the Court's questions.

THE COURT: Thank you. I think you answered -
MR. HABIB: If I could make one more point, your

Honor, which is specific to this case.

The circuit has indicated that whether documents are judicial is an inquiry that is often made on a categorical basis, right? That is to say, is a motion for summary judgment a judicial document or not, and sort of the case-specific considerations are addressed at the balancing stage.

At the balancing stage here, we have what this Court determined was appropriate, was to order Mr. Cruciani to complete, under penalty of perjury, an affidavit that is far more detailed than the CJA Form 23, and that was appropriate. The Court was discharging its statutory responsibility to assess financial eligibility.

That said, the privacy implications here are quite different than with respect to a one-pager. There's much more information presented in Mr. Cruciani's affidavit. In addition, there's information that pertains to his health that I'm sure the Court observed.

And so the privacy interests here are much greater than those that were at stake in Avenatti; not just because the financial affidavits were less detailed in Avenatti, but Mr. Avenatti was ill-positioned to complain about violations of his privacy. And, in addition, the government had conducted a fairly thorough investigation of his finances, as Judge Furman pointed out, so that his financial privacy interests were minimal, given that investigation, and I'm not sure that's the case here.

THE COURT: And when going back to your argument that the presumption is weaker in this context, how does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel come into play here? In other words, the determination that needs to be made based on the financial affidavit goes to an extremely significant Constitutional right, and that Constitutional right is extremely significant, but the right to counsel is undoubtedly significant both to the defendant and also to the public. How does that come into play in assessing whether the presumption is strong or weak?

MR. HABIB: I think it comes into play in the following way: That a categorical rule, to the extent one is adopted, should, to the greatest extent possible, unburden the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right. That is to say, any rule that could dissuade a defendant from asserting his Sixth Amendment right or resulting him foregoing an available

benefit under the Sixth Amendment should be disfavored.

Rather, the rule that's appropriate in this context is one that encourages candid disclosure and an accurate determination of eligibility above all.

And in the specific context of financial privacy, which is a value that many Americans hold dear, that balance should be struck in favor of nondisclosure to encourage frankness throughout the evaluation of the application.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Habib.

Ms. Kim, let me turn to you. I guess I'll start with anything you wish to respond to that Mr. Habib just raised.

MS. KIM: Sure, your Honor. Thank you.

I will try not to repeat what is in our submission, but just responding to some of defense counsel's arguments:

With respect to the CJA plan and its incorporation of judicial policy, by reference, of course, neither the CJA plan nor the judicial policy are binding, and the precedent set by the Second Circuit certainly trumps here.

As Mr. Habib has said, where there's a tension between a Constitutional right and judicial policy, the Constitution also here prevails. And it is worth noting that the defense has addressed the analysis under common law, but under the First Amendment, there's an even higher burden that's placed on the defense in weighing interests of the defendant versus public access under the First Amendment.

In terms of *Suarez*, which is a First Amendment case and touches upon common law, Judge Furman addressed *Suarez*, and explained that there is actually even more of a reason in cases involving CJA financial affidavits versus the types of documents that were at issue in *Suarez*, and the reason why there's more of an interest in public access to financial documents than even those in *Suarez* is because they, of course, play a critical role in the Court's determination of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, for court-appointed counsel.

The documents that are at issue in this case are subject to penalty of perjury and are in the context of a motion that's before the Court.

I think what is important to sort of focus on in this case is the heart of the matter; first, the fact that the Second Circuit has held that these types of questions should be aired in adversarial proceedings. And the defense has conceded that the government has a role to play here, but the government can't really play a role because we haven't seen any of the defendant's financial materials, so we can't take a position or potentially correct something that may be incorrect.

In Avenatti, Judge Furman explained that the adversarial proceedings are particularly important, because they discourage perjury, they assist the Court in its judicial function, and they ensure that the decision that's ultimately

reached is one that's weighed and considered based on facts and potential challenges to those facts.

The second sort of important question at the heart of the matter is the fact that these documents are of public importance. A member of the press has already written in and asked for access to the documents on two occasions. And the reason why public importance and public access is important in this case is because public access assures that these procedures are approached in a fair and transparent manner.

I think there's a public question as to how formally, sort of wealthy individuals, wealthy defendants, once they appear in federal court, move for court-appointed counsel, and that has been commented on in the press in the context of Avenatti and also in this case. And so I think there's a public question of how are tax dollars being spent. And in that sense, there's an importance in public access to these documents.

In terms of the chilling effect that the defense has alluded to, in this particular case, it seems that ensuring that there's an adversarial process and there's public access to these documents would further ensure that the contents of the documents are accurate, because they could potentially be challenged by the government and information that the government has and/or by members of the public.

The policy arguments, I'm not sure if Judges Furman

and Oetken had addressed sort of the day-of presentment arguments, but as the Court noted, this particular case is distinguishable because there has been a question here and a concern about the defendant's financial eligibility, given his past practice as a physician and the multiple properties that he had purchased before he was charged in this case.

And so, here, the defendant is not relying on the Fifth Amendment to advocate for sealing and ex parte filing of these documents. He has not made a Constitutional claim. He's making a claim of privacy. And we haven't seen the document so we can't offer potential redaction suggestions, but it appears that those third-party privacy concerns could be addressed through redactions.

THE COURT: Why should this case be treated differently than the normal criminal case? I mean, I'm sure right now today in magistrate court a number of defendants will be signing financial affidavits, and none of those one-page affidavits are likely to be publicly filed or publicly available. Why should this be different?

MS. KIM: Your Honor, this case is certainly different because the defendant appeared initially with retained counsel. He has retained counsel and is able to pay retained counsel in other matters. And his history shows that he, at one time, had the financial assets to, for example, purchase property, to obtain retained counsel, to live a comfortable lifestyle. And

he was a practicing physician holding esteemed positions at various medical institutions for years and years.

These are points that the Court touched upon at our last proceeding. But this case is distinguishable because there is a question of, for the public, how a defendant like Mr. Cruciani, who seems to have amassed certain wealth and assets over the last couple of decades could be financially eligible for court-appointed counsel.

I think there's a second question for the Court, which the Court raised when the motion was made for court-appointed counsel of whether or not the defendant has certain assets and actually is eligible for court-appointed counsel given his financial background, and so I think the difference is, here, there are certain defendants on the day of presentment who defense counsel have said have likely de minimis assets and not very much to disclose. There's also a presentence report that comes out the day of the presentment as well, and so there's less of a question of whether or not those defendants are eligible for court-appointed counsel, whereas here, there are concerns and there are open questions both for the Court and for the public.

THE COURT: Ms. Kim, what's the government's view as to whether if the financial affidavit were unsealed and provided to the government, whether the government would be permitted to use any of that in a case in chief? In other

words, do you read *Harris* as essentially saying the government cannot use this? There needs to be some degree of use immunity here.

MS. KIM: Certainly. Based on Second Circuit precedent, it appears the government would not be able to use the defendant's financial affidavits in its case in chief, unless it's a case for perjury or false statements.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Habib, anything further?

MR. HABIB: May I make a few brief points, your Honor?

First, in this case, the eligibility determination has been made. This Court reviewed the affidavit which set forth in excruciating detail why Mr. Cruciani is unable to retain counsel at this juncture. It was said in public, so I would be at liberty to repeat it here, that his assets have been substantially depleted over the course of the past. four and a half years as he has defended litigation in multiple other jurisdictions.

As I think Ms. Macedonio pointed out at a prior hearing, he spent approximately \$1.4 million to pay retained counsel in other cases, and that's why, presumably, this Court concluded he's entitled to counsel here.

THE COURT: And I realize you're not counsel, neither you nor Mr. Gombiner were counsel at that point, but granted, without the level of detail in the second affidavit, isn't a

lot of it out of the bag from that proceeding?

MR. HABIB: Come again, your Honor?

THE COURT: Isn't a lot of the information out there from that proceeding?

MR. HABIB: From prior -- for what?

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I think it was

December 2, 2021, where this issue was first raised, certainly with nowhere close to the level of detail in the January 6, I believe, affidavit. But to some extent, weren't some of these issues aired in open court?

MR. HABIB: Obviously, to the extent an issue has been aired in open court, the privacy interests have dissipated.

The second point I'd like to also make is with respect to accuracy. I'd say two things. One, I think in the vast majority of cases, the knowledge that a financial affidavit is going to be publicly disclosed is going to harm rather than hurt the accuracy determination. To put it very concretely, Mr. Gombiner and I many times at magistrate court will go through a financial affidavit, and we'll learn a defendant has substantial debt for maybe embarrassing reasons, like a gambling debt or a credit card debt or supporting an unemployed family member. And I can easily imagine why a defendant would not want to put that information before the public on the day of his arrest.

In addition, there are significant checks on the back

end that ensure a proper determination.

So, for example, there is in connection with the preparation of a presentence report, there are going to be financial disclosures that are going to be sought in a case where there's the possibility of forfeiture or fine or restitution. Those disclosures are going to be material there. The government, of course, is investigating as the case progresses, and the government may come into possession of information that calls for the defendant's financial eligibility into question.

All of those sources of information can be brought to bear retrospectively. And, by the way, pursuant to 3006A(f) the Court can see recoupment if it's determined that appointment of counsel was inappropriate.

Of course, the financial affidavit is also prepared under penalty of perjury, which is a serious oath and a serious obligation that dissuades defendants from untruthful representations.

Finally, I would say, I am pleased that Ms. Kim recognizes that under Harris the government would be precluded from using this material in its case in chief. As I've alluded to earlier, that's not the only use that this information could be put. It could be used to develop investigative leads, and it could also be used to identify assets that are subject to forfeiture and restitution and potentially to seizure prior to

an adjudication of guilt, and so those interests would not be protected.

The last thing I'll say is Ms. Kim indicated that we weren't making a Constitutional argument with respect to the Fifth Amendment. That's true. We are very much pressing a Constitutional argument wit with respect to the Sixth.

THE COURT: Let me also note for the record that

Ms. Kim alluded to an e-mail I received. The e-mails are two
correspondences in support of unsealing from Matthew Russell

Lee, who is with a media outlet called Inner City Press. The
first is dated January 10, 2022, and the second was dated
February 2, 2022.

The second submission specifically responded to the Federal Defenders' submission earlier that day. As we learned of these letters, because the government referenced them in their submission, both letters were e-mailed to my chambers' inbox but were automatically diverted to my junk mail folder. So when I saw the government's submission, I was able to dig them out, and I have reviewed them.

While Inner City Press has not formally moved to intervene and is not a party in this case, I have considered both letters in connection with today's proceeding. By and large, many of the arguments in those letters are in line with the arguments presented by Ms. Kim on behalf of the government in support of disclosure and unsealing.

Does either counsel have any objection to me putting those letters on the docket? Ms. Kim?

MS. KIM: No, your Honor.

MR. HABIB: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: I will do so most likely later today.

All right. Let me turn now to my ruling on this matter. And I thank the parties for their excellent written submissions and very thorough and helpful argument today.

In addition to the parties' submission, I have reviewed the relevant case law, both in this circuit and out of this circuit, and this district's CJA plan.

With respect to the specific facts presented here in this case, I agree with the weight of authorities in the Second Circuit on this issue, and deny the application to file the defendant's November 29, 2021 and January 6, 2022 financial affidavits under seal and ex parte.

I am mindful of many of the issues raised by Mr. Habib and Mr. Gombiner, and I will permit defense counsel to propose redactions to those affidavits, especially as to the January 6 affidavit, which was quite detailed.

I will now state my findings.

The Criminal Justice Act mandates the appointment of counsel for any person charged with a felony offense who is financially unable to obtain adequate representation. That's at 18 U.S.C. Section 3006A(a).

Before a judge may appoint counsel under the CJA. The Court must conduct an inquiry into whether the defendant is financially unable to obtain counsel. The burden is on the defendant to show his or her financial eligibility for court-appointed counsel. *United States v. Harris*, 707 F.2d 653, 660 (2d Cir. 1989).

Now, in this district, typically, this inquiry entails a judge, usually a magistrate judge on duty that day, considering financial information provided by the person seeking appointment of counsel in the form of a sworn affidavit. Sometimes that may be under oath in open court before the judge.

Now, it is well-established that there is a qualified right of access to criminal proceedings under the First Amendment. One of many cites for that would be Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). This includes a right of access to pretrial proceedings and to certain documents filed in connection with criminal proceedings. Hartford Courant v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2004).

And as I've discussed, there is also a common law right of access to judicial documents, and I want to give a cite for that, one of the main cases in this circuit on this topic is Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3s 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006).

So let me start with whether Mr. Cruciani's financial affidavits are judicial documents to which the presumption of access applies, and I find that they are.

The Second Circuit has broadly defined that a judicial document is a document that is relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process. And for that, *United States v. Amadeo*, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995). A document is relevant to the performance of the judicial function if it would reasonably have the tendency to influence a district court's ruling on a motion or in the exercise of its supervisory powers. And a cite for that is *Brown v. Maxwell*, 929 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2019).

Judge Furman recently found in the *Avenatti* case, the financial affidavits are relevant, indeed critical, to the appropriate inquiry a court is statutorily mandated to conduct when tasked with determining if a criminal defendant is financially eligible for appointment of counsel at public expense. That's United States v. Avenatti, 2021 WL 3168145, at *6, from Judge Furman's decision from July 27, 2021.

And I similarly conclude that the determination of whether a defendant is eligible for appointment of counsel under the Criminal Justice Act is a judicial function and constitutes an exercise of a court's supervisory powers. And the financial affidavits submitted in this case by Mr. Cruciani are plainly relevant to my performance of that function.

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I therefore find there's a qualified First Amendment right of access to the financial affidavits. Various other decisions support this conclusion. Some are very much on point, like Judge Furman's decision in *Avenatti*, some are maybe not directly on point, but certainly extremely instructive.

Other cases that are more on point, United States v.

Correia, a November 12, 2020 decision from Judge Oetken, that's at 2020 WL 6683097, Judge Oetken there held that the

First Amendment right of access and the common law right of access applied to financial information declarations in connection with the defense counsel's motion to be relieved.

And I note in Judge Oetken's observation in Correia that it is difficult to see why the financial affidavits at issue in determining financial eligibility depart from the judicial documents associated with criminal pretrial proceedings as to which the Second Circuit previously recognized the

First Amendment right of access. And that's at page 2 of that decision.

To that end, the Second Circuit in Harris determined that proceedings regarding a defendant's financial eligibility for court-appointed counsel should not be held ex parte because that would be manifestly conceptually incompatible with our system of criminal jurisprudence. That's at 707 F.2d at 662. The court in Harris observed that while Congress obviously knew how to provide for an ex parte proceeding when it seemed

appropriate, and there, specifically, it mentions for services other than counsel, and ensuring that a defense is not prematurely or ill-advisedly disclosed, Congress did not do so in the context of appointment of counsel.

And in *Suarez*, the Second Circuit held that there's a First Amendment right of access to CJA forms on which judicial officers have approved payments to attorneys or to others who provided expert or other services to the defendant in that case, such as investigators, interpreters, computer experts. *United States v. Suarez*, which was a 1989 Second Circuit decision, 880 F.2d 626. And in *Suarez*, I should note this was in the context of payment that had been approved.

I reviewed the First Circuit decision in *In re Boston*Herald, *Inc.*, 321 F.3d 174, on which the defense relies in support of this argument that a financial affidavit is not s judicial document to which the presumption of access applies.

Of course, that decision is not binding on me, and after reviewing the contrary case law by courts in this circuit, I find those decisions, including the ones I just mentioned, more persuasive. I'm not inclined, therefore, to adopt the First Circuit's reasoning in *Boston Herald*.

As Mr. Habib noted, that is the first step. Because I find that the financial affidavits at issue are subject to the right of public access under the First Amendment, so the affidavits may be kept under seal only as higher value in the

First Amendment framework so demand. And that requires in my view and consideration of the specific facts of the case, applying that framework to the specific facts of this case, I find that any presumption has not been overcome.

I am mindful of the arguments raised about potential chilling effect, the Sixth Amendment right. I don't think that is a particularly strong concern in this case, but in any event, I believe that concern can be addressed by appropriate redactions, which I will turn to in a moment. But I do believe there are compelling reasons for why the financial affidavits at issue should be unsealed and provided to the government.

The defense contends that any presumption here is weak at best because the financial affidavits are an ancillary document that concern only the determination of Mr. Cruciani's CJA eligibility, and that there are countervailing privacy interests of Mr. Cruciani and his family and their personal financial information, and those countervailing interests are strong.

I'm not convinced that the presumption here is weak. I think it is relatively strong. The Criminal Justice Act anticipates the involvement of a United States magistrate judge or the court in nearly every phase of the appointment process, including the determination of whether appointment of counsel is appropriate. That is from the act itself at 18 U.S. Code, Section 3006A(c). The determination of whether a criminal

defendant is eligible for appointment of counsel under the Criminal Justice Act directly implicates that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, which is significant.

The defense has argued that Mr. Cruciani's financial privacy is at jeopardy, and here it's at jeopardy because he is indigent, and under the government's view, to avail themselves of their Sixth Amendment rights, poor defendants — and only poor defendants — must surrender their privacy. I do not read the government's submission to go that far or to suggest such a view, nor do I endorse such a view.

But applying the precedent in this circuit, it does require me to balance Mr. Cruciani's privacy interests and the privacy interests of third parties against the interests of the public in knowing how public funds are spent. *Suarez*, 880 F.2d at 632.

Going back to what I said before about looking at the specific facts of this case, in this case, I think the public's interest is strong, given that Mr. Cruciani and his wife were both practicing physicians, they own multiple properties,
Mr. Cruciani agreed to a \$2 million personal recognizance bond secured by three properties and multiple co-signers, and he initially proceeded in this action with three retained counsel.

I do pause to note what was discussed toward the end, as the Second Circuit indicated in *Harris*, this holding should

not be read to mean that the government may use Mr. Cruciani's affidavit against him as part of its direct case.

If there were to be any use of anything in the affidavit, there would certainly need to be additional briefing on that issue. It sounds like that is not something that needs to be addressed today.

But going back to the question of the privacy interests, while I deny the application to file the entire financial affidavits under seal and ex parte, I do recognize there may be privacy interests to third parties to protect, including of family members, particularly on account of the nature of the second affidavit, which was quite detailed, as it needed to be, because the original affidavit, which was just a normal standard form, did not provide enough information for me to assess financial eligibility — particularly, in light of the information already before me that I just mentioned about homeownership and the defendant's prior profession as well as his prior retention of counsel, in this case and from what I understand other cases as well.

And the government also seems agreeable to reasonable redactions as expressed in its February 9th letter.

And Mr. Habib, I know it's not your preferred outcome, but I assume the defense will want to propose redactions.

MR. HABIB: Yes.

THE COURT: So I will certainly consider redactions to

account for any privacy interests. Initially, I'll ask the parties to meet and confer about that. It's a bit unusual since Ms. Kim won't be able to see what actually is being redacted, but I'm hopeful that you can discuss general categories of information and whether you agree they will be appropriate for redaction.

And what I'm thinking, and I'm open to other suggestions, but after you have that opportunity to meet and confer, the defense can submit to me or file on the public docket a redacted version of the affidavits and then unredacted versions submitted to me ex parte and under seal. My individual rules have procedures for doing so. And if there's briefing in support of why certain redactions should be made, that also should be handled in the same way.

If there are portions of the briefing that the defense does not think should be filed publicly, the unredacted brief could be submitted ex parte and under seal with a public version filed in redacted form. After I received all of that, I will review everything and determine whether the proposed redactions, whether it be for the financial affidavits or any written submissions should remain redacted.

Mr. Habib, I know this is not your case, but how much time do you think will be sufficient for this your colleague to speak with Ms. Kim and then propose redactions?

MR. HABIB: So I would obviously want to talk to

Mr. Gombiner first. I personally will not be here next week because it's my children's school vacation. So I think maybe if we could have three weeks to do that. Is that reasonable, your Honor?

THE COURT: I think given the size of the affidavit, that might be reasonable. I do think it would be productive for your colleague and Ms. Kim to discuss what should be redacted. Is three weeks okay for the government?

MS. KIM: Yes, your Honor. And, actually, I will be traveling for work, and so if we could possibly even have four weeks, that would give us the opportunity to meet and confer fully.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. KIM: Just two quick questions. Was the Court anticipating that the government would also receive an unredacted version of the application for the meet and confer or no?

THE COURT: I was not. I did not have a mind that you would receive an unredacted version of the entire affidavit before the meet and confer, but more discuss the general categories of information that would be appropriate.

Mr. Habib, do you think a conversation could be had in which, without showing parts that you think should be redacted, they can be described in a way that a discussion could occur?

MR. HABIB: I think that's feasible, your Honor.

MS. KIM: And the ultimate unredacted version would be filed with the Court and also sent to the government after the redactions are made, or would it be filed ex parte?

THE COURT: The unredacted version would be sent just to $\ensuremath{\text{me}}.$

MS. KIM: Okay.

THE COURT: And then there probably will be a few different ones after that. One, what's publicly filed, which may be the proposed redacted version; it may be the unredacted version, depending on what is being sought to be redacted and whether I agree with that.

And I suppose it's also a possibility that I could decide that certain materials should be redacted, but the unredacted version should go to the government. That's a possible scenario, but not having reviewed it, I can't say for sure.

MS. KIM: Okay. And the second quick question was, would the Court like for defense counsel to keep time records? I know that was an issue that came up on December 2, and I just wanted to reraise that now, now that new counsel has been appointed.

THE COURT: Mr. Habib?

MR. HABIB: I would say it's not necessary only because the Court, as I said, has made the determination of eligibility. In our view, that determination was

well-supported by the affidavit.

I think in light of the materials disclosed in the affidavit, it's extremely unlikely that Mr. Cruciani will be retroactively found ineligible or found to have assets that would permit him to pay Federal Defenders in part for any of these services or to pay the Court in part for any of these services. And it would impose what will likely be a complex case some burden on us in our office, and so I respectfully suggest that's not necessary.

THE COURT: So I guess what I am wondering is if one of the properties is only in Mr. Cruciani's name, and I'm not sure if that's the case --

MR. HABIB: I think I know the answer exactly, but it's escaping me at the moment whether that's public or not.

MS. KIM: It is public.

So it was discussed at the December 2 conference.

There is one property, the Jersey City property, that is under the defendant's name, and I believe as well as the wife's name, and that is securing the bond in this case and also in the Manhattan DA Office's case, and so it's possible that property could become available.

THE COURT: And that's what I wanted to ask you about, Mr. Habib, if the bond did not require that property being secured, he might not be eligible under the CJA. So if there is a conviction and the bail is therefore lifted, would there

be a scenario where — maybe this is for Ms. Kim — there would be a request that that property be liquidated and used to pay for cost of representation?

MS. KIM: I think that's possible, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HABIB: Your Honor, obviously, we're several steps away from that. I think I would want to look at the extent to which a family residence is subject to liquidation for that purpose. I don't know off the top of my head, but, for example, there would be a homestead exemption and a bankruptcy, I don't know whether a similar rule would apply. I wanted to look at that before that occurred, obviously.

THE COURT: Right now, I'm not going to direct Federal Defenders to keep time records. If the government thinks there's a reason to do so, send me a submission and explain the basis for it and any case law supporting it. But for now, I'm not going to require the maintenance of records.

MS. KIM: Okay.

THE COURT: Let me ask. I entered a protective order last week. Is there an update on the production of discovery?

MS. KIM: Yes. So there is one subpoena return that's fairly substantial, and we have an outside vendor who's processing and has finished Bates stamping that return. But apart from that one return, the rest of discovery has been produced and made available to the defense.

THE COURT: Mr. Habib, I know you're not in a position to talk about discovery, but have you heard any issues on your end?

MR. HABIB: I haven't. I just haven't discussed discovery with Mr. Gombiner. I apologize for that.

THE COURT: Certainly. It's understandable.

MR. HABIB: What I would say is I believe Mr. Cruciani was saying to me earlier that the state court trial is now scheduled to go forward on March 21 for jury selection and March 29th for the presentation of evidence. So the Court can take that into account when setting a next date in this matter.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. KIM: Your Honor, I believe the next date has already been set for April 19th. Just given our understanding of what we've seen with state court cases regularly being adjourned because of the pandemic, we would ask that if there's any adjournment of that date, we submit a request to the Court, or the defense submit a request to the Court before that April date.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Habib, if you ask Mr. Gombiner to keep me and Ms. Kim apprised of whether that March trial date goes forward for now, but we'll keep the April 19th conference. I believe it's April 19th at 9:30, but it would be good to know what's going on with that case.

MR. HABIB: Of course.

THE COURT: We went pretty long and covered a lot. Is there anything further we should address?

MS. KIM: Not from the government, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Habib?

MR. HABIB: I have one question, which I think I'm ethically required to advise Mr. Cruciani that he is entitled to take an interlocutory appeal of the Court's ruling. I think Suarez is one case, for example, that discusses that such an order is appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.

If Mr. Cruciani decide he wants to pursue the appeal, I guess I would ask what the Court's view would be on staying unsealing pending disposition of the appeal, which appears was the course followed in *Suarez* itself.

THE COURT: So right now the timeline we have set for you to report back to me in four weeks should give you time to figure out if an appeal is going to be sought. If there is, then I would say make an application Thursday. But I think we can hold off on addressing that to see if an interlocutory appeal is sought.

MR. HABIB: I think it would most likely be a 14-day notice of appeal, so you're right about that.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything further from the defense, then?

MR. HABIB: No, your Honor.

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               THE COURT: From the government?
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               MS. KIM: No, your Honor. Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Thank you, all. Have a good rest of the
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      day. Take care.
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               (Adjourned)
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